{"id":6722,"date":"2019-05-07T19:39:07","date_gmt":"2019-05-07T17:39:07","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.apador.org\/?p=6722"},"modified":"2019-05-10T15:14:49","modified_gmt":"2019-05-10T13:14:49","slug":"eterna-controversa-a-numirii-judecatorilor-de-la-curtea-constitutionala","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/apador.org\/en\/eterna-controversa-a-numirii-judecatorilor-de-la-curtea-constitutionala\/","title":{"rendered":"Eterna controvers\u0103 a numirii judec\u0103torilor de la Curtea Constitu\u0163ional\u0103"},"content":{"rendered":"

Sorry, this entry is only available in Rom\u00e2n\u0103<\/a>. For the sake of viewer convenience, the content is shown below in the alternative language. You may click the link to switch the active language.<\/p>

\u0218i cum propune APADOR-CH, \u00eenc\u0103 din 2013, o restructurare \u0219i depolitizare a CCR, astfel \u00eenc\u00e2t s\u0103 se evite polemicile din jurul numirii fiec\u0103rui judec\u0103tor la Curte.<\/h3>\n

Curtea Constitu\u0163ional\u0103 (CCR) este format\u0103 din 9 judec\u0103tori, numi\u0163i de c\u0103tre 3 entit\u0103\u0163i distincte: Pre\u015fedintele Rom\u00e2niei (3 judec\u0103tori), Senat (3 judec\u0103tori), Camera Deputa\u0163ilor (3 judec\u0103tori). Mandatul unui judec\u0103tor constitu\u0163ional dureaz\u0103 9 ani \u015fi nu poate fi re\u00eennoit. Deci, la expirarea fiec\u0103rui mandat de 9 ani, va fi numit un nou judec\u0103tor. Numirea noului judec\u0103tor se va face de c\u0103tre cel care l-a numit \u015fi pe cel anterior (al c\u0103rui mandat a expirat), respect\u00e2ndu-se astfel propor\u0163ia de 3-3-3 \u00een compunerea CCR.<\/p>\n

De fiecare dat\u0103 c\u00e2nd se pune problema numirii de noi judec\u0103tori la CCR, at\u00e2t din mediul politic, c\u00e2t \u015fi din pres\u0103 \u015fi din spa\u0163iul public \u201enealiniat\u201d, apar nemul\u0163umiri \u015fi critici vehemente \u00een leg\u0103tur\u0103 cu procedura numirii \u015fi cu calitatea candida\u0163ilor.<\/p>\n

Desigur, dup\u0103 ce sunt numi\u0163i noii judec\u0103tori, aceste critici \u015fi nemul\u0163umiri se sting, aten\u0163ia emiten\u0163ilor reorient\u00e2ndu-se spre alte subiecte de actualitate.<\/p>\n

Cele mai frecvente critici se refer\u0103 la faptul c\u0103 persoanele numite nu se ridic\u0103 la \u00een\u0103l\u0163imea func\u0163iei de judec\u0103tor constitu\u0163ional. Deci, ar fi util de v\u0103zut cine stabile\u015fte \u201e\u015ftacheta\u201d pentru aceast\u0103 func\u0163ie \u015fi la ce \u00een\u0103l\u0163ime.<\/p>\n

\n

Condi\u0163iile pentru ca un cet\u0103\u0163ean s\u0103 fie numit judec\u0103tor constitu\u0163ional sunt prev\u0103zute \u00een Constitu\u0163ie (art. 143) \u015fi sunt \u00een num\u0103r de 3:<\/p>\n

– preg\u0103tire juridic\u0103 superioar\u0103 (=absolvent al facult\u0103\u0163ii de drept)<\/p>\n

– vechime de cel pu\u0163in 18 ani \u00een activitatea juridic\u0103 sau \u00een \u00eenv\u0103\u0163\u0103m\u00e2ntul juridic superior<\/p>\n

– \u00eenalta competen\u0163\u0103 profesional\u0103<\/p>\n<\/div><\/div>\n

Are importan\u0163\u0103 faptul c\u0103 aceste criterii sunt prev\u0103zute \u00een Constitu\u0163ie \u015fi nu \u00eentr-o lege inferioar\u0103 Constitu\u0163iei? Da, pentru c\u0103, din acest motiv, la cele 3 condi\u0163ii din Constitu\u0163ie nu pot fi ad\u0103ugate, prin alte legi \u00een afar\u0103 de Constitu\u0163ie, condi\u0163ii suplimentare prin care s\u0103 se restr\u00e2ng\u0103 posibilitatea numirii\u00a0 unei persoane ca judec\u0103tor constitu\u0163ional. O astfel de lege ar fi neconstitu\u0163ional\u0103, pentru c\u0103 ar ad\u0103uga la Constitu\u0163ie.<\/p>\n

Dac\u0103 \u00een cazul a 2 condi\u0163ii pentru a fi judec\u0103tor constitu\u0163ional, verificarea \u00eendeplinirii lor este relativ simpl\u0103 (verificarea diplomei de absolvire a facult\u0103\u0163ii de drept \u015fi verificarea vechimii de 18 ani), controversele s-au purtat \u015fi se poart\u0103 cu privire la condi\u0163ia privind \u201e\u00eenalta competen\u0163\u0103 profesional\u0103<\/em>\u201d.<\/p>\n

Cine are metrul etalon pentru a m\u0103sura \u00een\u0103l\u0163imea competen\u0163ei profesionale a fiec\u0103rui candidat la func\u0163ia de judec\u0103tor constitu\u0163ional?<\/p>\n

Un r\u0103spuns la aceast\u0103 \u00eentrebare a fost dat chiar de c\u0103tre CCR, prin decizia nr. 459\/2014. \u00cen spe\u0163a respectiv\u0103, o asocia\u0163ie a magistra\u0163ilor a contestat \u00een instant\u0103 decretul preziden\u0163ial de numire a unui judec\u0103tor la CCR, pe motiv c\u0103 persoana numit\u0103 ca judec\u0103tor nu ar fi \u00eendeplinit condi\u0163ia \u201e\u00eenaltei competen\u0163e profesionale<\/em>\u201d.<\/p>\n

Prin decizia amintit\u0103, CCR a stabilit c\u0103 singura entitate competent\u0103 s\u0103 aprecieze dac\u0103 este sau nu \u00eendeplinit\u0103 condi\u0163ia \u201e\u00eenaltei competen\u0163e profesionale<\/em>\u201d este chiar entitatea care face numirea, iar nu o instan\u0163\u0103 de judecat\u0103 sau oricine altcineva.<\/p>\n

Astfel, CCR a precizat c\u0103 \u00een ceea ce prive\u015fte condi\u0163ia \u201e\u00eenaltei competen\u0163e profesionale<\/em>\u201d, aceasta implic\u0103 evaluarea \u015fi decizia exclusiv\u0103 a autorit\u0103\u0163ilor abilitate de Constitu\u0163ie s\u0103 fac\u0103 numirea (pre\u015fedinte, Senat, Camera Deputa\u0163ilor), \u00een temeiul unor aprecieri proprii. \u00cen acest scop, aceste\u00a0 entit\u0103\u0163i pot folosi toate informa\u0163iile cu privire la profilul candidatului: cariera profesional\u0103, probitatea moral\u0103, experien\u0163a \u00een domeniul juridic sau calit\u0103\u0163ile individuale, elemente ce se circumscriu no\u0163iunii de \u201e\u00eenalt\u0103 competen\u0163\u0103 profesional\u0103\u201d.<\/p>\n

Potrivit CCR, Pre\u015fedintele Rom\u00e2niei, Senatul \u015fi Camera Deputa\u0163ilor \u201eau libertatea absolut\u0103<\/u> de a alege o anumit\u0103 persoan\u0103 apreciat\u0103 a \u00eentruni condi\u0163ia \u00eenaltei competen\u0163e profesionale<\/u><\/em>\u201d<\/strong>. Decizia de numire \u00een func\u0163ia de judec\u0103tor CCR apar\u0163ine \u00een exclusivitate titularilor prev\u0103zu\u0163i de Constitu\u0163ie \u015fi implic\u0103 o apreciere subiectiv\u0103, \u00eentemeiat\u0103 pe informa\u0163iile care sunt evaluate \u00een mod personal, de c\u0103tre fiecare deputat sau senator, prin acordarea votului \u00een cadrul deciziei colective a fiec\u0103rei Camere a Parlamentului, respectiv de c\u0103tre Pre\u015fedintele Rom\u00e2niei, care manifest\u0103 o op\u0163iune personal\u0103.<\/p>\n

CCR mai arat\u0103 c\u0103 a accepta o tez\u0103 \u00een sensul c\u0103 \u015fi altcineva dec\u00e2t pre\u015fedintele sau cele dou\u0103 camere pot analiza condi\u0163ia subiectiv\u0103 a \u201e\u00eenaltei competen\u0163e profesionale<\/em>\u201d echivaleaz\u0103 cu negarea atribu\u0163iilor constitu\u0163ionale proprii ale celor dou\u0103 Camere ale Parlamentului, respectiv a Pre\u015fedintelui Rom\u00e2niei, care ar deveni astfel atribu\u0163ii comune\/partajate cu alte entit\u0103\u0163i (instan\u0163e judec\u0103tore\u015fti etc.), ceea ce contravine prevederilor art. 1 alin. 4 din Constitu\u0163ie referitoare la principiul separa\u0163iei puterilor \u00een stat, precum \u015fi dispozi\u0163iilor art. 1 alin. 5 care consacr\u0103 principiul suprema\u0163iei Constitu\u0163iei. Prin urmare, \u00een ceea ce prive\u015fte \u00eendeplinirea condi\u0163iei \u00eenaltei competen\u0163e profesionale, nici instan\u0163ele judec\u0103tore\u015fti \u015fi nici oricine altcineva nu are vreo competen\u0163\u0103 de control \u015fi cenzur\u0103, <\/strong>\u00een <\/strong>afar\u0103 de <\/strong>entit\u0103\u021bile care fac numirea.<\/strong><\/p>\n

Concluzia<\/strong> care se poate trage este c\u0103 dac\u0103 vrem modific\u0103ri reale, de substan\u0163\u0103 ale criteriilor \u015fi modului de numire a judec\u0103torilor la CCR, este nevoie de o abordare serioas\u0103, care presupune demersuri pentru revizuirea (modificarea) Constitu\u0163iei. Simplele declara\u0163ii \u00eenfl\u0103c\u0103rate, date de circumstan\u0163\u0103 \u015fi \u00een c\u0103utare de like-uri nu rezolv\u0103 nimic.<\/p>\n

\u00cen acest context, APADOR-CH reaminte\u015fte c\u0103, \u00een anul 2013, cu ocazia dezbaterilor parlamentare organizate pentru revizuirea Constitu\u0163iei, a formulat propuneri \u015fi pentru restructurarea\/depolitizarea Cur\u0163ii Constitu\u0163ionale.<\/p>\n

Varianta 1<\/u><\/strong>: \u00eenfiin\u0163area \u00een cadrul Cur\u0163ii Constitu\u0163ionale a 2 sec\u0163ii cu componen\u0163e \u015fi atribu\u0163ii total diferite: a) o sec\u0163ie de contencios constitu\u0163ional<\/em>, format\u0103 numai din judec\u0103tori din cadrul ICCJ, care s\u0103 aib\u0103 \u00een atribu\u0163ii controlul anterior \u015fi posterior de constitu\u0163ionalitate al actelor normative; b) o sec\u0163ie de proceduri constitu\u0163ionale<\/em>, din care s\u0103 fac\u0103 parte: juri\u015fti (al\u0163ii dec\u00e2t judec\u0103torii), politicieni, persoane din societatea civil\u0103 cu bun\u0103 reputa\u0163ie. Aceast\u0103 sec\u0163ie ar urma s\u0103 aib\u0103 \u00een competen\u0163\u0103 solu\u0163ionarea celorlalte probleme dec\u00e2t controlul constitu\u0163ionalit\u0103\u0163ii actelor normative, probleme care nu necesit\u0103 o rezolvare strict juridic\u0103, ci preponderent politic\u0103.<\/p>\n

Varianta 2<\/u><\/strong>: \u00eenfiin\u0163area \u00een cadrul \u00cenaltei Cur\u021bi de Casa\u021bie \u0219i Justi\u021bie (ICCJ) a Sec\u0163iei de contencios constitu\u0163ional<\/em>, format\u0103 numai din judec\u0103tori de la ICCJ \u015fi transformarea Cur\u0163ii Constitu\u0163ionale \u00een Consiliul Constitu\u0163ional<\/em>, format din consilieri constitu\u021bionali (\u00een loc de \u201cjudec\u0103tori\u201d), din care s\u0103 fac\u0103 parte: juri\u015fti (al\u0163ii dec\u00e2t judec\u0103torii), politicieni, persoane din societatea civil\u0103 cu bun\u0103 reputa\u0163ie. Noua sec\u0163ie de la ICCJ \u015fi noul Consiliu Constitu\u0163ional vor avea atribu\u0163ii distincte, sec\u0163ia va avea atribu\u0163ii preponderent juridice\/tehnice, iar consiliul \u2013 atribu\u0163ii preponderent politice.<\/p>\n

De asemenea, APADOR-CH a propus, \u00eenc\u0103 din 2013, introducerea unei prevederi \u00een sensul c\u0103 pronun\u0163area CCR cu privire la constitu\u0163ionalitatea unui text de lege nu se poate face dec\u00e2t prin \u201eda<\/em>\u201d sau \u201enu<\/em>\u201d (adic\u0103, textul este sau nu este constitutional), f\u0103r\u0103 folosirea unor solu\u0163ii intermediare de genul \u201e\u00een m\u0103sura \u00een care\u2026<\/em>\u201d. Posibilitatea pe care o are CCR, \u00een actuala reglementare, de a se pronun\u0163a cu privire la constitu\u0163ionalitate nu doar prin \u201eda\u201d sau \u201enu\u201d, ci \u015fi prin \u201e\u00een m\u0103sura \u00een care\u2026<\/em>\u201d \u00eei transfer\u0103 nejustificat atribu\u0163ii ce \u0163in strict de Parlament \u015fi o transform\u0103 \u00een organ legiuitor.<\/p>\n

Citi\u021bi propunerile integrale ale APADOR-CH din anul 2013<\/a>.<\/p>\n

","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Sorry, this entry is only available in Rom\u00e2n\u0103<\/a>. For the sake of viewer convenience, the content is shown below in the alternative language. You may click the link to switch the active language.<\/p>\n

Care sunt propunerile pe care APADOR-CH le-a f\u0103cut \u00eenc\u0103 din 2014 pentru depolitizarea \u0219i restructurarea Cur\u021bii Constitu\u021bionale<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":3285,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[29,81],"tags":[255,90,212,833],"class_list":["post-6722","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-comunicate","category-slider","tag-constitutie","tag-curtea-constitutionala","tag-judecator","tag-numire-judecator-curtea-constitutionala"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/apador.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/6722","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/apador.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/apador.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/apador.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/apador.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=6722"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/apador.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/6722\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/apador.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/3285"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/apador.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=6722"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/apador.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=6722"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/apador.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=6722"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}